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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Nicholas David Johnson appeals from a judgment of conviction for murder in the
second degree following a jury trial.

On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts that the district

court erred when it admitted, over his objection, several autopsy photographs without
conducting the balancing test required under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403.

He also

asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified life
sentence, with fifteen years fixed, and when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion in light of the new information provided in support thereof.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Johnson was charged with murder in the second degree for his role in the
death of Jarmey Mccane.

(R., pp.23-24.) The charge arose out of an incident that

occurred in the early morning hours of June 25, 2011, following a "get-together" at the
home of Bill and Stacy Kron.

Among those present were the Krans, Ray and Stacy

Lopez, Mr. Mccane (Stacy Lopez's brother), Mr. Johnson, and Paul Weremecki.
Alcohol was being consumed, 1 and the evening consisted of everyone "[j]ust hanging
out, talking, [and] visiting." Mr. Mccane came late to the get-together, and Ms. Kron

1

With respect to the alcohol consumption, both sides stipulated to the following facts,
which were read to the jury:
Jarmey McCane's blood alcohol content on June 25th, 2011 at 2:12 a.m.
was 0.18. Stacy Lopez's blood alcohol content on June 25, 2011 at 5:00
a.m. was 0.13. Raymond Lopez's blood alcohol content on June 25, 2011
at 5:56 a.m. was 0.11. Nicholas Johnson's blood alcohol content on
June 25, 2011 at 8:30 a.m. was 0.069.
(Tr., p.563, L.12 - p.564, L.1.)
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could immediately "feel . . . tension" when he was introduced to Mr. Johnson.
(Tr., p.271, L.16- p.283, L.14, p.439, L.8-p.443, L.25.)
Mr. Weremecki testified that, during the course of the evening, he heard a
commotion outside, and when he looked outside, he "saw Bill standing between Nick
and Jarmey ... saying, 'Don't disrespect my house. Don't disrespect my friends that
are here.' Kind of bumping the chest, like breaking them up kind of a deal." It looked to
him like a fight was either about to happen or had just happened, and he saw Mr. Kron
holding Mr. Johnson back and standing between him and Mr. Mccane. By the time that
he left, he felt like "things kind of calmed down a little bit.

The vibe kind of calmed

down." When asked whether it seemed "like the defendant let it go," he responded, "It
did. It seemed like everybody was pretty calm." At the time that he left, "it seemed like
everybody was talking and getting along." (Tr., p.448, L.9 - p.452, L.18.)
The get-together ended between 1:45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. when Mr. Kron became
concerned because, upon returning from relieving himself in his backyard, he heard his
wife "say, 'My daughter's here.

You guys, please have some respect."'

Mr. Kron

testified that, upon hearing his wife say this, and in light of the earlier incident (testified
to by Mr. Werenecki), he decided that he was "done with the situation.

I went to my

room, I grabbed a bat, and I came back out, walked past everybody towards my sliding
glass door, and told everybody the party - that it was over.

It was time to go."2

(Tr., p.467, L.24 - p.472, L.11.) Once the bat had been put away and everyone was
outside in the street, Mr. Kron began apologizing, first to Mr. Lopez, then to Ms. Lopez,

2

There is some dispute regarding whether Mr. Kron held the bat in the air when he
ordered everyone out of his house, with Mr. Kron denying doing so (Tr., p.473, Ls.5-16),
but his wife testifying that "he held it up and he said, 'Just go. Everybody just go."'
(Tr., p.289, Ls.17-21.)
2

and finally to Mr. Mccane. Mr. Mccane then apologized to Mr. Kron "for disrespecting
me at my - disrespecting my house." Mr. Kron estimated that this series of apologies
went on for "approximately five to seven minutes."

Mr. Kron did not know where

Mr. Johnson was at that time, but he was not in the street with the rest of the group.
(Tr., p.474, L.24-p.477, L.20; p.484, Ls.11-19.)
Robert Deters, a medical examiner for Canyon County, testified concerning the
Mr. McCane's cause of death, a single stab wound that "penetrated the right side of the
chest and right lung, and as a result of that injury, this individual died." (Tr., p.409, L.15
- p.413, L.25.)

Dr. Deters also testified concerning several photographs that were

taken during the autopsy.

State's Exhibit No. 37 is a photograph of the wound.

(Tr., p.415, L.19 - p.417, L.8; State's Exhibit No. 37.)

State's Exhibit No. 38 is a

photograph of the wound with a probe inserted to show trajectory, and depicts a portion
of Mr. McCane's face, including his right ear and part of his chin. (Tr., p.419, L.19 p.420, L.18; State's Exhibit No. 38.) State's Exhibit No. 39 is "a photograph of the heart
and right and left lungs, showing a fairly large stab wound on the lateral right upper
lobe."

(Tr., p.423, Ls.9-25; State's Exhibit No. 39.)

State's Exhibit No. 40 is a

photograph "of the right side of the chest with a probe in place." It also shows the inside
of the rib cage and appears to show a large portion of the right side of Mr. McCane's
chest without skin.

(Tr., p.425, L.24 - p.426, L.18; State's Exhibit No. 40.) All four

exhibits were admitted over Mr. Johnson's continuing Rule 403 objections. (Tr., p.415,
L.19-p.426, L.18.)
Mr. Johnson testified that, sometime after midnight, Mr. McCane apparently
misinterpreted some of his sarcasm and felt disrespected by something he said; this
appears to have been the incident described by Mr. Weremecki.
3

As a result,

Mr. Johnson "apologized and shook his hand and told him I didn't mean any hard
feelings towards you or anything like that." Sometime between 1:45 a.m. and 2:00 a.m.,
there was a "ruckus" and Mr. Johnson wasn't sure but felt like someone may have "felt
disrespected." As a result, "all of a sudden I see Bill [Kron] come out with a baseball bat
and usher us out the door." This caused Mr. Johnson to become "nervous" because,
I didn't really understand the situation of the bat. I didn't think things were
that bad. And the fact that a person that's intoxicated had a baseball bat
kind of made me nervous. I let them proceed out the door before me,
because I wanted to keep distance. And they proceeded out to the street,
so I followed out to the porch. And they happened to be in front of my
truck, so I kind of wanted to let the issue resolve itself before I attempted
to go to my vehicle.
(Tr. , p. 612, LA - p. 614, L. 11 .)
While the others were in the street and Mr. Kron was apologizing to them,
IV1r. Johnson "heard someone say, like, This is because of an outsider, and I should kill
him,' or somewhere (sic] along the lines of that." At that point, he "went back inside
hoping that they would leave.

And I grabbed a knife, because I could see the body

language in these people, that they looked like they were going to approach me with a
physical altercation." Mr. Johnson then returned to the front porch, put the knife in his
pocket, and began smoking a cigarette while he waited for the area around his truck to
clear. He explained that his intent in carrying the knife was "that if any sort of physical
altercation - or altercation came towards me that I could just present the knife and just
resolve that, and hopefully it wouldn't be a - kind of scare them away."
Mr. Johnson then began sending text messages to his girlfriend, attempting to
get her to pick him up. As he was putting his phone back in his pocket, "I got a glimpse
of people moving towards me, advancing towards me on the porch." When he looked
up, he saw Mr. Mccane "standing in the middle of the porch way ... [h]alfway between
4

the door and the far wall."

Based on the significant differences in size between

~Jlr. Mccane and Mr. Johnson (he is five feet, eight inches tall and weighs one hundred
sixty pound, while Mr. Mccane "was about six-two, six-three, anywhere from 250 to 260
[pounds]"), Mr. Johnson was concerned that Mr. Mccane could inflict serious bodily
injury upon him, and felt that he was under severe threat from Mr. Mccane.
f1M. l\t1cCane then "took a few steps toward me and I retreated back [to the wall at the far

corner of the porch] and he swung." Mr. Johnson explained that, while retreating, "I
started pulling the knife out of my pocket, hoping that he would see it ... I then was
backed up in a defensive manner and put my hand up like this (indicating), as I seen
[sic] a punch coming towards me. And I swung the knife with my head down." He
explained that swinging the knife "was a reaction. I felt like I was being bombarded. It
was just an instinct."

(Tr., p.615, L.4 - p.624, L.14.)

Mr. Johnson testified that he

''[n]ever" had any intent to cause severe bodily harm to Mr. Mccane, and that when he
used the knife, he was acting purely in self-defense. (Tr., p.634, Ls.11-18.)
After stabbing Mr. McCane, Mr. Johnson noticed Ray Lopez coming at him,
trying to grab him and take a swing at him.

He was able to run to his truck, with

Mr. Lopez "right behind me, grabbing me." He had to kick Mr. Lopez to get free of his
grasp, and managed to pull the truck door shut.

At that point, Mr. Lopez punched

through the window, breaking it, and Mr. Johnson was able to lean out of the way of the
punches before speeding away. (Tr., p.624, L.15 - p.625, L.11.)
Once he had gotten safely away from the scene, Mr. Johnson went to his
girlfriend's house, where he told her, "I was just in an altercation and I think I stabbed
somebody."

He then changed out of his bloody shirt and called 911 to report the

stabbing. The 911 call ended up getting disconnected, and the 911 operator eventually
5

called him back. Mr. Johnson described himself as being "in shock and still hysterical
about what had happened" when the 911 operator called back. When asked to give his
name, he "got scared and locked up and gave them a false name." 3 At that point, his
girlfriend was driving him to his house, and they were pulled over by several police
officers. (Tr., p.625, L.20 - p.628, L.24.)
Following several jury questions, Mr. Johnson was found guilty of murder in the
second degree. (R., pp.132-38.) At the sentencing hearing, the State requested the
imposition of a unified sentence of forty-five to fifty years, with twenty years fixed.
(Tr., p.800, L.23 - p.801,

14.) Defense counsel requested "a unified sentence of 10 to

15 years with a fixed [term] not to exceed five to eight."

(Tr., p.805, Ls.6-12.)

Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified life sentence, with fifteen years fixed.
(Tr., p.815, Ls.14-16.)
Mr. Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from entry of the judgment of
conviction. (R., p.149.) Mr. Johnson then filed a timely Rule 35 motion and requested a
hearing on that motion. In support of his motion, Mr. Johnson provided new information,
specifically that since his sentencing, "I am continuing [to pursue] my degree as well as
several other programs and classes/' and that he had "not received any discipline
actions and only continue to focus on the positive opportunities there are to better
myself with the resources available." (R., p.169.) The district court denied the request
for a hearing (R., p.179), and later denied the Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Rule 35
Motion (augmentation).)

3

The false name that Mr. Johnson provided was "George Hernandez." (State's Exhibit
No. 1, 0:00 to 0:58.)
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ISSUES
1

Did the district court err when, over his Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 objection, it
admitted four autopsy photographs without conducting the balancing test required
under Rule 403?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence,
with fifteen years fixed, following Mr. Johnson's conviction for murder in the
second degree?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when, in light of the new information
provided, it denied Mr. Johnson's Rule 35 motion?

7

ARGUMENT

I.
The District Court Erred When, Over His Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 Objection, It
Admitted Four Autopsy Photographs Without Conducting The Balancing Test Required
Under Rule 403
Mr. Johnson objected, under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403, to the introduction of
several autopsy photographs, primarily due the limited probative value that the
photographs had given his stipulation to the cause and manner of death. The district
court, without conducting the balancing test required under Rule 403, admitted four of
the proposed exhibits. This failure to conduct the required balancing test amounts to
error, and should result in the reversal of Mr. Johnson's conviction.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides, "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." I.RE. 403.
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained Rule 403 as follows:
The rule creates a balancing test. On one hand, the trial judge must
measure the probative worth of the proffered evidence. The trial judge, in
determining probative worth, focuses on the degree of relevancy and
materiality of the evidence and the need for it on the issue on which it is to
be introduced. At the other end of the equation, the trial judge must
consider whether the evidence amounts to unfair prejudice ... Only after
using this balancing test, may a trial judge use his discretion to properly
admit or exclude the proffered evidence.
Davidson v. Beco Corp., 114 Idaho 107, 110 (1987) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added). This Court has upheld the admission of graphic photographs of a
murder victim's body after a district court conducted the proper balancing test
articulated in Davidson. See State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 407 (1991) ("The trial court
balanced the unfair prejudicial value of the photographs with the relative probative value
8

and concluded that the four photographs allowed into evidence were less inflammatory
than the other [six] photographs, and that they also clearly contained relevant evidence
to a contested issue in the case.").
In this case, the district court was faced with a Rule 403 objection to several of
the State's proposed exhibits, photographs from an autopsy of Mr. Mccane, which were
labeled State's Exhibit Nos. 36 to 40. (Tr., p.381, L.15 - p.393, L.1.) While the district
court appears to have conducted the requisite balancing test in excluding one of the
proposed exhibits (Tr., p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.10), specifically finding that the excluded
exhibit "tends to be inflammatory, and there's no fact at issue that the photo, No. 36,
establishes" 4 (Tr., p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.10), it failed to do so with respect to the
remaining four photographs.

In reaching its decision to admit the remaining four

photographs, the district court explained the standard to be employed,
Let me first of all apply the standard. We're talking about, you know the there's a - this is ultimately a discretionary call on the court. First of all, I
looked at is it relevant. Are there facts at issue in the case that these
exhibits and photographs will assist the jury in deciding. And then are
they outweighed by cumulative or prejudicial or inflammatory impact that
might inflame the passions of the jury.
(Tr., p.400, Ls.5-14.)
The district court then cited to several appellate cases concerning the admission
of photographs of murder victims.

(Tr., p.400, L.15 - p.402, L.17 (citing State v.

Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396 (2000), State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80 (Ct. App. 2011), and
State v. Peters, 116 Idaho 851 (Ct. App. 1989)). Recognizing "that there's a lot of facts
in this case that are just not contested" including "who was present, the events that
occurred, or the cause of death," the district court then explained,

4

The State's proposed Exhibit No. 36 was described as "the face of the victim on the
autopsy table." (Tr., p.398, Ls.14-15.)
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But in this instance there is a factual issue before the court of not
the cause of death, but the degree of culpability in the cause of death.
And that's the, as I understand, the state's relevancy of this exhibit [sic], is
to establish the degree of culpability. And I'm going to permit those
exhibits to be admitted, and I'm going to make an admonition to the jury.

The other exhibits that you have offered [other than 36], based on
the issues before the court, are appropriate - are necessary, and I will
advise the jurors about that, and they've been warned about this coming
up. So I'll allow those to be - provided you continue to lay the foundation
with your witness.
All right. So I've ruled on those, got the arguments. And just noting
for the record, just to recapitulate. It isn't - there is a factual issue that
hasn't been stipulated to, and that is the factual issue of the degree of
culpability in the crime. And that is reflected - or at least the state's
position is that can be determined by the testimony - supported by the
testimony of your witness. So that's an issue before the jury for them to
consider and the witness to be cross examined on.
(Tr., p.405, L.21 - p.407, L.7.)
As can be seen from the district court's explanation for admitting State's Exhibit
Nos. 37 through 40, it clearly considered the relevance of the exhibits, but never
balanced the relevance of the exhibits against the potential for substantial prejudice as
required under Rule 403.

This failure amounts to error, and should result in

Mr. Johnson's conviction being vacated, with the matter remanded to the district court
for a new trial.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Life Sentence, With
Fifteen Years Fixed, Following Mr. Johnson's Conviction For Murder In The Second
Degree
Mr. Johnson asserts that, in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his
case, including his sincere expression of remorse and regret and his lack of any prior

10

felony convictions, the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive and amounts
to an abuse of discretion.
\/\/here a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest.

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."'

v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting

State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)).
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Mr. Johnson does not allege that his

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Johnson must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. These governing criteria are: (1)
protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
Mr. Johnson has continuously expressed remorse and regret and accepted
responsibility for his role in the death of Mr. Mccane.

The night of his arrest,

Mr. Johnson asked the police about Mr. McCane's condition, and "[w]hen notified
Jarmey had died, Nicholas had tears in his eyes and said, 'It was fucked up, he had
taken a life, and it was on his hands."' (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), p.4.)
When asked to explain how he felt about his crime, Mr. Johnson wrote,
Horrible. I went to an environment that I didn't expect any type of
altercation and when things began to get hostile I should have made
better decisions. I cannot believe that this actually happened. I could
never be prepared for this Situation [sic] and handled it horribly. I never

11

intended to hurt anyone let alone take a life.
I feel horrible for
Mr. McCain's [sic] family and loved ones and wish I could go back and see
things as clearly as I do now. It was a bad situation that led to a bad
decision that resulted in the loss of a life that was never intended. It's a
tragedy for all parties involved, even my family. I cannot express how
truely [sic] sorry I am.
(PSI, p.8 (quotation marks omitted).) He also explained that his crime "is something I
have to live with every day." (PSI, p.8 (quotation marks omitted).)
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Johnson again expressed remorse and regret while
accepting responsibility, explaining,
I would like to apologize to everyone here today. I am truly sorry for the
mistake that I made that ended in absolute tragedy. I have spent the last
six months in constant regret, wishing that I could go back and change
things. Sadly, all I can do is tell you guys how truly sorry I am and hope
that one day you can all forgive me.
I am very sorry for my poor judgment, and I do feel the guilt of my actions,
actions for which I acknowledge and take full responsibility for. Everything
had happened so quickly, and I never expected this outcome. I may never
fully know the pain that you are all feeling, but I do understand the
damage that I have done.
I have let down so many people that expected so much more of me, and I
hurt people that I do not know. I never intended for any of this, and you all
deserve better. Again, I am truly sorry. Thank you.
(Tr., p.807, Ls.6-25.) The PSI writer noted, "Mr. Johnson did appear remorseful when I
interviewed him." (PSI, p.22.)
The events underlying this case had their genesis in alcohol use.

As

Mr. Johnson explained regarding his use of alcohol, it has "[p]roved to be a problem
every time I used it." (PSI, p.21 (quotation marks omitted).) The PSI writer noted, "The
defendant was intoxicated when he committed the present offense." (PSI, p.22.) With
respect to his alcohol issue and the role it played in this offense, Mr. Johnson has
expressed a desire to participate in alcohol treatment. (PSI, p.22.)
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Mr. Johnson, who has six younger siblings, had a troubled and turbulent
childhood. His parents divorced when he was twelve years old, due to his mother's use
of illegal drugs.
years old.

His father had abused alcohol until Mr. Johnson was about twelve

After the divorce, his mother continued to abuse illegal drugs, and

Mr. Johnson "moved back and forth between his parents while growing up." When he
was fourteen, he and one of his brothers moved to Missouri to live with their father.
Upon returning to Idaho one year later, "he noted, 'My mother was using drugs even
worse than before, the house was disgusting, and there was no food to eat. She had
been trading our food stamps for meth."' Soon thereafter, Mr. Johnson's siblings were
removed from their mother's home and placed into foster care. However, Mr. Johnson
was not placed in foster care because ''[t]hey said I was too old and unwilling to go."
His father returned to Idaho to deal with the situation, and eventually gained custody of
Mr. Johnson's siblings. During that time, however, Mr. Johnson "dropped out of school
and worked to help his father."

His mother continued to abuse drugs, making no

attempt to help her children. (PSI, p~.17-18.)
Mr. Johnson enjoys the support of his family, reporting that "he shares a close
bond with his brothers and sisters."

(PSI, p.17.)

Since his troubled childhood, his

mother has gotten clean, begun going to school to become a nurse, and they have
gotten close.

He described his relationship with his father as "[a]mazing."

One of

Mr. Johnson's sisters, Denise, told the PSI writer, "Right now, we are actually really
close, like best-friends close. He is a good person and cares for his family and adores
his daughter." (PSI, p.18 (quotation marks omitted).)
Several other mitigating factors are present in Mr. Johnson's case.

First, this

case represents Mr. Johnson's first and only felony conviction. (PSI, p.22.) Second,
13

"[a] representative of the Canyon County Sheriff's Office confirmed [that while in
custody on this offense] the defendant received two minor infractions and noted he is,
·overall, a pretty good inmate."'

(PSI, p.17.)

Third, Mr. Johnson has expressed a

desire to engage in "self changing classes, drug/alcohol classes as well as mental
health sessions," and has explained that he will do his "best to works [sic] towards
redemption," and that any sentence he receives "will not just be a sentence for me but
an opportunity to open my eyes to my faults and to rehabilitate myself to become an
active member of society."

(PSI, p.22.)

Finally, Mr. Johnson, despite not having
0., 5 began attending classes at Treasure

completed high school or obtained a

Valley Community College shortly before the incident resulting in his conviction. (PSI,
p.20.)
In light of the mitigating factors present in his case, Mr. Johnson asserts that the
district court abused its discretion when it imposed a unified life sentence, with fifteen
years fixed, following his conviction for second degree murder.

He asserts that the

appropriate sentence for his offense is fifteen years, with five years fixed.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When, In Light Of The New Information
Provided. It Denied Mr. Johnson's Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 is
addressed to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for
leniency which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.

State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether

5

Mr. Johnson has expressed a desire to earn a G.E.D. (PSI, p.20.)

14

the original sentence was reasonable."

Id.

If the sentence was not excessive when

pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or
additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
When new information has been presented in support of a Rule 35 motion, the
appellate courts conduct "an independent review of the entire record available to the
trial court at sentencing, focusing on the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest." Id.

When determining whether a

sentence is excessive, the appellate courts "consider the entire length of the sentence
under an abuse of discretion standard to determine its reasonableness." Id.
Mr. Johnson provided new information in support of his Rule 35 motion, namely,
thaC since his sentencing, "[d]uring my incarceration I am continuing my [Structural Fire
Science] degree as well as several other programs and classes," and that he had "not
received any discipline actions and only continue to focus on the positive opportunities
there are to better myself with the resources available." (R., p.169.)
Mr. Johnson asserts that when this new information is viewed together with the
mitigating circumstances discussed in part II, supra, he has demonstrated that the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. For the reasons
set forth herein and in part II, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court order
that his sentence be reduced to a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter to the district court for a new
trial.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a

unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.
DATED this 26 th day of December, 2012.

S
NCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

16

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
IH
CERTIFY that on this 26 th day of December, 2012, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to:
NICHOLAS DAVID JOHNSON
INMATE #102304
KCCC CB-101-8
PO BOX 2000
BURLINGTON CO 80807
GREGORY CULET
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
E-MAILED BRIEF
WILLIAM LITTLE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720-0010
Hand delivered to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court.

EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

SJH/tmf

17

